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JURY TRIAL NOT WAIVED BY SIMULTANEOUSLY
PENDING MOTIONS FOR DIRECTED VERDICT
Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Eblen,
167 Ohio St. 189, 147 N.E.2d 486 (1958).
With this opinion the Ohio Supreme Court has cleared from the
books a 57-year old rule which-together with a myriad of exceptions
thereto-had posed a continuing threat to the unwary advocate. Orig-
inally propounded in First National Bank v. Hayes & Sons,' it provided
that concurrently pending motions for directed verdict made by the parties
at the close of the evidence clothed the court with the functions of the
jury and that a directed verdict should not then be set aside except as
against the weight of the evidence. A further proviso in the Hayes case
indicated that all this happened only when the party whose motion was
denied failed to request the case go to the jury on its facts. The when,
where and how of making this request have since furnished grist for
subsequent litigation of and exception to the rule.2
The present case aptly illustrates the sort of situation in which the
rule has operated. During trial before the Akron Municipal Court
after both the parties had rested, plaintiff moved for a directed verdict.
Defendant renewed his motion for directed verdict made at the close of
plaintiff's case. The court stated it would rule on both motions after an
hour's recess for lunch; with the recess over and before the jury had
been dismissed, the court stated it was deciding the case on its merits
and found in favor of the plaintiff. Defendant immediately requested
that the case go to the jury on its facts, and alternatively sought to
withdraw his motion for directed verdict. The court ruled the request
came too late and entered judgment. On appeal the Summit County
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment on. the ground that defendant
was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to request submission of the
facts to the jury. The case was taken to the Ohio Supreme Court upon
allowance of a motion to certify, and the appellate court's judgment was
affirmed, one judge concurring separately and the chief justice dissenting.
Rather than affirm on the ground used by the court of appeals, as
urged by Judge Zimmerman in his concurring opinion, Judge Matthias
for the five-judge majority re-examined the entire rule, found it sup-
' 64 Ohio St. 100, 59 N.E. 893 (1901); for a recent court of appeals case
employing the new Ohio rule, see Ohio-River-Frankfort Cooperage Corp. v.
Brainard, 148 N.E.2d 68 (1958).
2 Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Schmidt, 131 Ohio St. 132, 2 N.E.2d
264 (1936); Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. v. Luthy, 112 Ohio
St. 321, 147 N.E. 336 (1925); Nead v. Hershman, 103 Ohio St. 12, 132 N.E.
19 (1921); Perkins v. Board County Comm'rs, 88 Ohio St. 495, 103 N.E.
377 (1913).
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ported by "neither experience nor reason and justice," 3 and held that
any motion for directed verdict in Ohio requests a ruling on law only.
The Hayes rule is variously described as the "majority rule"4 and
as the "New York rule." 5 The leading case of Buetell v Magone8
had made it a fixture of federal practice prior to its abrogation by Rule
50 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The reasoning upon
which the rule rests has been expressed several ways,' but the two theories
described by Judge Matthias cover the field: (1) that the consecutive
motions are indications by each party that he desires to waive jury trial,
and (2) that the motions indicate agreement between the parties that
no question of fact remains in the case. The majority opinion finds the
first theory to be inappropriate -both because the facts normally indicate
no such desire on the part of the complaining party (ordinarily inadver-
tance on the part of counsel is assigned as the reason for letting things
progress to this point) and because the Ohio statutes specifically provide
the method of waiving jury trial and the Hwayes rule fits none of the
specified categories.' The second theory is rejected on the ground that
a motion for directed verdict is a request for a ruling on law only and
admits no facts except for purposes of the ruling.'
A considerable 'body of case law interpreting the Hayes rule had
been developed since inception of the rule in 1901. Jury trial was held
waived by consecutive motions for directed verdict upon the pleadings
after impaneling of the jury but prior to presentation of any evidence."0
In Perking v. Board County Comm'rs" both parties sought directed
verdicts at the close of the evidence; it was held to be reversible error not
to grant defendant's request that the case go to the jury when the request
came after defendant's motion was overruled and prior to a ruling on
plaintiff's motion.
3 Carter-Jones Lumber Co. v. Eblen, 167 Ohio St. 189, 207, 147 N.E.2d
486 (1958).
453 Am. JUR., Trial §§341-346 (194-5); Annot., 108 A.L.R. 1315 (1937);
Annot., 69 A.L.R. 633 (1930); Annot., 18 A.L.R. 1433 (1922).
588 C.J.S., Trial §256(b).
6 157 U.S. 154 (1895).
7 53 AM. JUR., Trial §343 (1945).
8 OHio REv. CODE §2315.20 (1953), provides: "In actions arising on contract,
trial by jury may be waived by the parties, and in other actions with the assent
of the court as follows:
"(A) By consent of the party appearing, when the other party fails to
appear at the trial, in person or by attorney;
"(B) By written consent, in person or by attorney, filed with the clerk;
"(C) By oral consent in open court entered on the journal." Cf. N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT §426.
9 Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246
(1934).
10 Strangward v. American Brass Bedstead Co., 82 Ohio St. 121, 91 N.E.
988 (1910).
11 88 Ohio St. 495, 103 N.E. 377 (1913).
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Nead v. Hershman2 and Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
Louis Ry. v. Luthy13 presented a related problem. In both cases defend-
ant first made a motion for directed verdict, and this was followed by a
similar motion by plaintiff. In each case the court sustained plaintiff's
motion without ruling on the motion by the defendant. In the Hershman
case the defendant then requested the case go to the jury while in Luthy
the defendant merely excepted to the court's ruling. The supreme
court found reversible error in each instance, since neither defendant
had the opportunity to determine whether he wished to go to the jury
after requesting a ruling on the question of law. It is clear, however,
that either defendant could have avoided the problem by reserving his
right to have the case go to the jury when he made his motion.
It had also 'been held that the Hayes rule did not apply when
defendant made the initial motion for directed verdict, his motion was
ruled upon, and plaintiff then made a motion for directed verdict.14
Thus the second moving party could always avoid the "trap" by waiting
for a ruling on the preceding motion before making his own motion.
Of course the rule did not apply to defendant's motion at the close of
plaintiff's case, even if plaintiff purported to join in the motion. 5
In Buckeye State Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Schmidt'6 at the close
of the evidence defendant sought a directed verdict and plaintiff asked
for judgment. The court then announced it would dismiss the jury,
and after argument between counsel in which defendant said -he was
reserving the right to introduce further evidence, plaintiff announced
he wished to withdraw his motion since he did not think the judge
could dismiss the jury. Plaintiff did nothing more until eight days later
when he filed a motion seeking a separate finding of law and facts
and attempting to reserve his right to have the case go to the jury. The
supreme court held plaintiff's action came too late. A later case did hold
that a party is entitled to a separate finding of law and facts when the
judge sits as jury after consecutive motions for directed verdict.' 7
It appears that the instant case could have been reversed, as urged
by Judge Zimmerman, upon the theory underlying Perkins, Hershman,
and Luthy--i.e., that the party against whom the ruling is made should
have some opportunity to reserve jury trial. However, Judge Zimmer-
man's suggestion that the trial judge was under a duty to explain the
effect of the motions to counsel before ruling does not seem to have
a basis in any prior holding. The discussion in Ohio Jurisprudence8
refers only to a case in which the judge did follow this procedure and
12 103 Ohio St. 12, 132 N.E. 19 (1921).
13 112 Ohio St. 321, 147 N.E. 336 (1925).
14 Satterthwaite v. Morgan, 141 Ohio St. 447, 48 N.E.2d 653 (1943).
15 Canton v. Pryke, 5 Ohio App. 364, 26 Ohio C.C. Dec. 465 (1916).
16 131 Ohio St. 132, 2 N.E.2d 264 (1936).
17Levick v. Bonnell, 137 Ohio St 453, 30 N.E.2d 808 (1940).
18 39 OHIO JUR., Trial §219 (1935): "[T]he general rule, which is the one
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in which the court of appeals held no party could later claim surprise.1 9
There is also the possibility under such a holding that a party may pur-
posely fail to reserve his right to go to the jury, hoping to get the nod
from the judge, but secure in the knowledge he can always go to the
jury if he loses.
It appears that the supreme court had reached a point in regard
to the Hayes rule at which it was no longer willing to deprive a party
of his constitutional right to jury trial because of counsel's inadvertence
while at the same time further exceptions to the rule would have made
it a mockery of two-guess verdicts. In specifically overruling Hayes and
its subsequent cases,2" the court has handled the matter most effectively.
The broad language in the opinion may present some problems
regarding the status of waiver of jury trial generally in Ohio. How
would the court now treat the following situation? At the close of the
evidence both parties consecutively enter motions for directed verdict.
The judge, inadvertently following the now discarded Hayes rule, an-
nounces he will dismiss the jury and decide the case on law and facts
himself. Neither party objects, and the jury is dismissed-although
there was sufficient time between the judge's pronouncement and dis-
missal of the jury for counsel to raise objection. Must the case now be
tried anew or will counsel be deemed to have waived jury trial by their
actions?2 1 Too narrow an interpretation of the jury waiver statute22
would seem to defeat substantial justice in certain limited instances.
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established by the Ohio courts, is that if both parties to an action, at the con-
clusion of all the evidence in the case, request the court to instruct a verdict-
the plaintiff for a verdict in his favor and the defendant for a verdict in his
favor-without making any request that the jury be allowed to determine any
question of fact or indicating any desire to avail themselves, individually, of
their right to have questions of fact submitted to the jury if their motions are
denied, particularly after the court calls attention to the legal significance of
simultaneous motions by both parties and extends the opportunity to 'withdraw
them, the parties thereby clothe the court with the functions and duties that
ordinarily rest in the hands of the jury and submit the case for its findings upon
the facts as well as the law." (Emphasis added.)
19 State Auto Mut. Ins. Assn. v. Spileski, 10 Ohio L. Abs. 618 (1931).
20Also specifically overruled were: Levick v. Bonnell, supra note 17;
Industrial Comm'n v. Carden, 195 N.E. 551 (1935) ; Perkins v. Board
County Comm'rs, supra note 2; Strangward v. American Brass Bedstead Co.,
supra note 10-each as it related to the Hayes rule.
21 Whitworth v. Steers, 12 Ohio C.C. Dec. 272 (Cuyahoga county 1893);
aff'd mem., 53 Ohio St. 686, 44 N.E. 1150 (1895).
22Supra note 8.
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